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This research concerns a close air support weapon system
known as the Enforcer aircraft. This system was first intro-
duced to the military services from outside the formal
competitive channels addressed in the procurement regula-
tions, Althaugh there is no specific operational require-
ment for an Enforcer type aircraft/ it remains under
consideration as a lower-cost alternative close support
system in the so-called high/low mix acquisition strategy.
The research analyzes the progress, to date, of the Enforcer
as a system moving through the stages of the defense systems
acquisition process. Emphasis is placed on the differing
roles of the Enforcer's participants in that process. There
is a detailed critical examination of an Air Force Enforcer
cost effectiveness analysis and of the models used in that
analysis. Conclusions and recommendations arising from the
study are included, especially as they relate to the
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A. OVEBvTEfl AND THESIS ORGANIZATION
This research introduces the Enforcer close air support
weapon system and analyzes its progress within the framework
of the Department of Defense (DOD) major systems acquisition
process- The Enforcer was first proposed in 1971 as a low
cost alternative system to complement existing or proposed
aircraft designed to meet then current and projected close
air support requirements.
The focus of this research is on the unusual nature of
the Enforcer program's advocacy both within and outside of
the DOD, and on the cost effectiveness analysis conducted by
the 0. S. Air Force- This program is of interest to students
of the acquisition process because it has followed a path
best describe! as parallel to, rather than strictly within,
the formal steps outlined in procurement regulations.
In the remainder of this chapter we examine the economic
and political environment in the United States during the
Enforcer's equivalent of a concept formulation stage- ffe
also briefly outline the formal, nominal acquisition process
in effect during 1977. Chapter II summarizes the relative
positions of key participants in a quality versus quantity
debate which is mirrored by the Enforcer program, and
addresses tha probable rationale for those positions.
Chapter III examines tactical aircraft procurement cost
trends in the 1960's and the pressures on DOD to reverse
these trends. The DOD and Congressional responses, including
the high/low mix concept, are examined. Chapter IV describes
the Enforcer as a low cost alternative weapon system and
reviews its initial introduction to the military services.

Its advocacy bases in Congress and in the private sector are
presented, as is tie initial military services' response.
Chapter V defines the close air support mission in an opera-
tional requirement context. Existing military services'
programs in close air support are discussed. Chapter VI
describes congressional efforts to encourage military servi-
ces' sponsorship of Enforcer, reaction to those efforts, and
the continuing involvemeat of Enforcer's private sector
sponsors. Legal guestions raised by DOD concerning
Enforcer's status are introduced. Chapter VII describes
modeling assumptions for tactical aircraft acquisition deci-
sions and examines the Air Force sponsored computer analysis
of Enforcer cost effectiveness. Chapter VIII briefly reviews
the Enforcer program history subsequent to the Air Force
analysis and outlines the flight test program currently
underway. Chapter IX provides summary remarks and recommen-
dations for acquisition managers which are keyed to the
expected defense acquisition environment in the 1984-1989
time frame.
3. HEAPOI STSTES COST ESCALATION IN THE SIXTIES
Following a decade of substantial buildup of 0. S. stra-
tegic forces (missiles, submarines and aircraft), attention
shifted during the 1960's to the general purpose forces. As
ballistic missile procurement dropped off early in the
decade, a larger share of the DOD investment budget was
devoted to conventional force modernization. Real spending
in the defense sector increased dramatically during the
latter half of the decade as the Viet Nam war added to the
modernization program's requirements for hardware, mainte-
nance and support.
Several trends in the economy during the late 1960's
combined to severely constrain the funds available for
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defense investment. Inflation was trending upward at rates
considerably higher than those contained in budget assump-
tions. Anti-war sentiment became sufficient to influence
defense appropriations in the Congress. Domestic spending
requirements, many of them for programs initiated during
President Johnson's War on Poverty, were competing for a
larger share of the overall budget. Finally, American
industry was ieveloping increasingly complex and relatively
costly new weapon systems to replace some of the aging
pre-Viet Nam era general purpose forces.
This last development, the trend toward more complex,
higher technology solutions to defense reguirements, sparked
a debate among industry, congressional and 00D participants
in the acquisition process. That debate continues today and
is no closer to resolution than when it began. The issue
itself is as complex as some of the weapon systems over
which the debate centers. The basic problem which underlies
the issue has existed since the first defense appropriation
was enacted: how to allocate scarce resources among
competing claimants. In its simplest sense, the issue was
one of quality versus quantity in weapon systems. The
debate participants ranged from those for whom quality,
technological complexity and combat effectiveness were
synonymous, to those who measured combat effectiveness
solely on the basis of numbers of systems available for use.
Each participant faced the same budgetary constraints, and
most supported positions well inside the two extremes noted
above, but there was a wide range of defensible positions in
that middle ground.
Congress and the military services were the key opposing
debaters, while the defense industries tended to shift their
loyalties around as resource levels changed. The Executive
Branch involved itself mostly in the highly visible "big
ticket" weapon systems, while the Office of the Secretary of
11

Defense (OSD) and the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
occasionally joined in as key participants. The roles of
each of the above participants are central to the remaining
chapters, as is the role of the Enforcer in the debate. The
Enforcer program mirrors the continuing controversy and is
one of many pawns in the debate itself.
All of the participants agreed that data showed a
dangerous pattern of escalation emerging by 1970: new
system unit procurement cost increases consistently exceeded
real increases in defense outlays- This pattern was particu-
larly evident in tactical aircraft procurement, where the
data tend to support the position that high technology and
relative complexity go hand in hand with high program and
unit costs. [fief. 1] The Enforcer program was only one of
many proposed solutions to the squeeze between resources and
requirements in tactical air warfare- In the following
chapter some Df the data are presented- The very different
approaches to the unit cost squeeze taken by Congress and
the military services are examined.
C- THE FORMAL ACQUISITION PROCESS
Although the Enforcer story is one of deviation from the
formalized, nominal major systems acquisition process, it is
appropriate here to outline that process, or collection of
processes, to which the military services must adhere. The
governing acquisition regulations are constantly changing,
therefore the below outline describes three parallel
processes in effect in late 1977, during the time when Air
Force resistance to Enforcer test flights was at a peak.
The first major systems acquisition process was imple-
mented by Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109 and
by DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2. It was characterized by
the identification cf a mission need by the military
12

services, a need defined and documented by mission analyses
performed within the services 1 own staffs- The Required
Operational Capability (ROC, formerly the Operational
Requirement, or OR) was the service document which formally
identified the need and the operational capabilities needed
to meet that need- In the case of major systems acquisitions
(such as a new close air support aircraft) the Dffice of the
Secretary of Defense became involved. SECDEF approval for
such systems was stated in the form of a milestone 0, which
directed the sponsoring service to begin exploring alternate
concepts to satisfy the need- SECDEF approval was also
needed at milestone I - demonstration-validation, milestone
II - full-scale engineering development, and at milestone
III - production and deployment. Each of these decision
points was supported by documenting tha program in consider-
able detail in Decision Coordinating Papers (DCPs) and
through formal review in the Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC I, II, and III) . At each milestone
review the SECDEF was in effect reaffirming the need as the
program was allowed to proceed into the next phase.
vThe second process was the Joint Strategic Planning
System (JSPS) through which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
provided planning advice to the president and to SECDEF. An
important element of this process was the Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan (JSOP). Volume II of this annually updated
document tabulated the forces needed to execute mid- range
0. S- military strategy.
The third process was the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) , a kind of "umbrella" of rules which
guided the entire process and tied it to the congressional
budget cycle- Its key requirements included SECDEF issuance
of his Defense Guidance after reviewing JSOP I and issuance
of the Planning and Programming Guidance (PPG) after
reviewing the JSOP II. The PPG tied mission needs to
13

programs and was a formalized acknowledgement of the "legit-
imacy" of an approved major program as well as a guidance
document with budgetary constraints recognized. The services
responded to the PPG with their Program Objective Memoranda
(POM) which were formally reviewed by SECDEF. POM approval
was documented by SECDEF Program Decision Memoranda which,
with amendments and after a reclama period, became the vehi-
cles with which the services "priced" out their final POM
packages for submission to OSD- At the OSD level there was
further review with other agencies and personnel from the
Office of Management and Budget leading to the final defense
budget submission to the president.
The process described above was complex and filled with
checks and balances. As the services viewed it, it was a
process that did not permit them to unilaterally bring a new
major system into the inventory. With many refinements and
some major streamlining of phases which proved to be time-




II- THE QUALITY Y. 2511!?Ill DEBATE
A. THE COST EFFECTIVENESS ISSUE
In Chapter I we noted that the issue in the quality
versus quantity debate was prompted by the combination of
scarce resources for defense and rising unit costs of
procurement- When compared with other classes of weapon
systems, tactical aircraft unit costs were rising at a
faster rate and program managers for these forces felt more
of the squeeze than did their counterparts for other forces.
The Navy F-14 Tomcat fighter in 1973 was projected to cost
190 times as nuch as its closest World War II kin, the F-40
Corsair- [Eef- 2 ]• Smaller, but still very large, multi-
pliers are generated for other new tactical aircraft in
production or proposed during the late 19 60*s when they are
compared with their WW II counterparts. A new nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier, however, was only eighteen times
as expensive as its Essex class counterpart, although this
distinction seems lost in the shadow of its huge billion
dollar absolute cost- [fief. 3]
Multipliers aside, all program managers were competing
for scarce resources, and one of their primary tasks was to
demonstrate greater cost effectiveness of certain forces
over others and between competing weapon systems within the
same forces. For tactical aircraft program managers, the
task was even more difficult than for other program
managers. The unit cost increases mandated either a larger
share of the general purpose forces appropriations or
order-of-magnitude increases in combat capability per unit




The question of relative cost effectiveness (in a
combat capability context) among different general purpose
forces is clearly a part of tie debate, but it is not the
principal focus of this paper. As the focus narrows to cost
effectiveness assessments among proposed alternative
tactical aircraft, it is important to remember that a larger
debate exists which night propose entirely different forces.
Each level of debate is as complex as the next, each is
sensitive to the entire range of influences that divide the
debaters into opposing camps. For example, while opposing
participants debate the merits of alternative close air
support systems, programmers on the next higher level might
be proposing substitution of some close air support forces
with alternative forces such as unconventional warfare units
capable of sabotage. Both levels of management might use the
same rationale for their recommendations: maximum combat
effectiveness from a constrained resource base. Each level
attempts to specify optimal weapon system attributes by
viewing that system, or combination of systems, as a force
structure poised against some threatening force. The
criterion of choice is the maximum total capability within a
budget constraint, a measure as elusive as the range of
assumptions and scenarios which must be selected to struc-
ture the threat. This process of choosing was critical to
the results of the Air Force cost effectiveness evaluation
of Enforcer and is examined in later Chapters.
Superimposed on all of the^ rational analysis that is
associated with cost effectiveness studies is the problem of
service rivalries, ingrained and instinctive "turf" protec-
tion that greatly hinders unbiased analysis of multi-service
weapon system applications. In the Enforcer case the
deferral role played by the Army, (discussed in Chapters V
and IX), may have influenced the prioritization of close air
support scenarios by the Air Force.
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The authors recall hundreds of instances in their
careers in which suggestions, proposals, or changes were
offered, by another service, to a mission area or system
considered exclusively "Navy". Many such overtures would be
rejected at the outset simply because of the "turf" viola-
tion. These rivalries have, over the years, defied the best
efforts of Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to eliminate them from the planning and
programming process- Another dimension of this problem is
the inertia encountered when two or more services are
directed to analyze a multi-mission/multi-service concept by
higher authority- Such was the case with the TFX program in
the 1960*s, an 'unsuccessful attempt by Defease Secretary
Robert McNamara to develop a common Navy/Air Force tactical
fighter and attack aircraft
-
B. CONGRESSIONAL POSITION IN THE DEBATE
Congress, particularly through the influence of several
powerful members of the Armed Services Committees, usually
advocated the high quantity/lower cost weapon systems in
those limited cases where there were options available.
Among the early indications that the Congress would take
this stand, which was in opposition to the services* stand,
were a series of General Accounting Office (GAO) reports
beginning in the mid-1960* s. Each of four reports advanced
the theme of the previous, that the trend in DOD toward low
quantity procurements of highly sophisticated and costly
weapons was not affordable up front and was not providing
the predicted returns on investment. This acquisition trend
was producing its most disappointing results in tactical
aircraft procurements and is examined in Chapter III. The
last two GAO reports. Impe diments to Reducing the Costs of
Weapon Syste ms (1979) and Implications of Highly
17

Soph isticated Weapon Syste ms on Military. Capabilities (19 80)
both closed with the same, often repeated recommendation to
Congress: [Ref. 4]
..•the Congress should carefully examine lower cost
alternative programs before approving new weapons
systems. In particular it should examine with senior
military officials the pros and cons of larger quanti-
ties cr alternative weapon systems versus smaller
numbers of highly sophisticated and expensive systems.
From a historical perspective, Enforcers reception on
Capitol Hill (Chapter IV) was one of the earliest indica-
tions of a new emphasis on trading complexity and sophisti-
cation - usually synonymous with high cost - for simplicity
and quantity. Other more familiar efforts to curb rising
unit costs in tactical aircraft followed during the 1970*s.
Among these ware the A-10, F-16- and F-18 programs which were
at least begun in good faith as programs offering more "bang
for the tuck".
C. MILITARY SERVICE POSITIONS IN THE DEBATE
The services had always argued that in an atmosphere of
resource constraints the necessary emphasis had to be on
smaller numbers of highly sophisticated, high performance
systems capable of countering multiple threats wherever
possible. Planning and programming directives in the 1960's
were sufficiently flexible to allow acquisition managers the
freedom to stretch this emphasis to its limits: high tech-
nology became synonymous with combat capability and the cost
effectiveness exercises tended to be self-defeating.
Decision makers found themselves selecting new weapon
systems from among alternatives that were all
state-of-the-art, all multi-purpose/multi- mission, all very
expensive, and all Jikely to be procured in smaller-than-
desired quantities. There were certainly mission areas such
18

as electronic warfare for which lower cost alternative
systems were non-existent. The problem was that the process
of transforming any threats into operational requirements
and then of matching programs to those requirements by its
very nature accommodated the emphasis on highly sophisti-
cated alternatives. There was considerable autonomy within
the services with respect to these transformations. Stated
differently, there was no safeguard against tailoring an
operational requirement to an existing or proposed (and
favored) system. Chapters V and VII include discussions of
this process as it related to the Enforcer evaluation.
Tiiere was an additional flaw in the military service and
industry proposals of state-of-the-art systems. These new
systems were very capable of successfully countering
threats, even multiple threats, but projections of life
cycle operating and support (0 & S) costs were usually
underestimated. There was simply no data available to use
for accurate projections of costs since the technology jumps
between new systems and those they replaced were in several
orders of magnitude. The pace of technological advances
outstripped even the most ambitious modernization plans, and
the reaction among the services was to narrow the gap with
state-of-the-art (technologically risky) systems. The
acquisition strategy had become, out of perceived necessity,
one of maximizing combat capability for the long term,
because the systems had to last so long before anticipated
replacement. For the military, especially the Navy and Air
Force, combat capability was epitomized in the big ticket
systems such as the F-14 and F-15.
The services, of course, did not operate with total
autonomy. The GAO reports mentioned above contained recom-
mendations for DOD as well as for Congress concerning
control of runaway costs. For the time period addressed in
this paper, however, the majority position within the
19

services in the quality versus quantity debate favored
higher quality in lower quantities. Chapter III presents the
evidence of this, as well as evidence that the pendulum is
swinging, albeit slowly, toward more and more consideration
of the congressional point of view. Even today, however,
with volumes of data on disappointing performance and proof
of grossly underestimated operating and support costs and
overestimated budget projections it can be argued that the
services still favor the highest technology options.
The Defense Departments own Defense Science Board
seemed to predict the hurdles ahead for the debate in a 1973
study which is still applicable today. [fief. 5]. It stated
that the drive for performance at all costs was a cultural
problem, that the tendency to bias a decision in favor of a
high performance option was present in all levels of the
acquisition process: operational requirements, technical
approach, system program office practices and staff biases.
It further stated that individual values had to be changed,
and incentives established to promote individual awareness
that the tendency toward high performance is not the only
way to go.
The key to the remaining chapters of this paper is the
phrase "not the only way to go". This thesis will not
attempt to disprove the service position in the debate, but
it will examine the difficulties encountered when an equally
defensible case is occasionally presented for a lower cost
alternative. The Enforcer may or may not have been an
equally defeasible alternative system, but the Science
Board's observations noted above can be seen at each level
of scrutiny it received in the Air Force analysis. We will
not go so far as to suggest that the decision might have
been different had the bias been removed because the
evidence suggests otherwise, but Enforcer was not scruti-
nized under the same ground rules as other more sophisti-
cated systems under consideration at the time.
20 ^

To summarize the positions of the two key participants
in the debate: Congress, closer to the constituency
providing the resources with their taxes, felt more pressure
to "wind down™ from the high defense spending levels during
the Viet Nam war, and can observe the costs and benefits of
various levels of sophistication with considerably more
detachment than the services and with analytical help from
GAO, a relatively independent source. Analytical assistance
to military programmers is frequently provided by their own
staff analysts. Congress was naturally more suspicious of
DOD's optimistic resource projections and tempers its
projections with a historical perspective. It favors
increasing general purpose force levels with larger quanti-
ties of less costly, less capable weapons. The military
services, on the other hand, start their preliminary
programming with an objective of long term combat effective-
ness which translates to state-of-the-art technology and
multi-mission capabilities. They are concerned with delaying
the inevitable obsolescence, a concern not necessarily
compatible with lower cost "throwaway" concepts of proven,
somewhat older technology. Unfortunately this is the cost-
liest and riskiest path toward self-defense and security,
and it sometimes tolerates "projecting" or hypothesizing
threats and tailoring requirements to favored systems. There
are honorable men and women on both sides of the debate,
acting in good faith for what they perceive to be the best
interests of the country.
Both sides, in fact, may be partly right. If, in consid-
ering the wide range of possible future threats, the deci-
sion maker rationally places the highest priority on a
"worst case" scenario, then most analyses will favor the
highest technology system. In this case, the weapon system
becomes thought of more as a platform for delivering a
specific weapon than as part of a force structure. When the
21

"worst case" scenario is determined to have a lower priority
than others, perhaps due to a very low probability of occu-
rence, the most cost effective choice may be a combination




III. PBESSOBE FOR CHANGE
A. TACTICAL MBCfiAFT COST TRENDS
In Chapter I it was suggested that there was agreement
among defense systems acquisition managers and in Congress
that a clear and dangerous pattern of escalation in costs
had emerged by 1970. This trend was most evident in tactical
aircraft procurements- U.S. tactical aircraft are the most
complex in the world, this complexity is associated with
high unit costs and lower quantities, and it seems natural
that the focus of much congressional attention in the early
1970' s was upon this highly capital-intensive segment of our
defenses. Cost escalation was enhanced by higher then
expected inflation rates, sharply higher operating costs
after the crude oil price increases in 1974, and higher
manpower and training costs in the All-Volunteer Force.
Taken together, however, these accounted for only one-third
of the unit :ost increases. The culprit was the hardware
itself, the high cost of multi-mission capability and
complexity. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate a critical factor
in the trend toward lower procurement totals and higher unit
costs.
The direction in which the trend lines are headed is the
reason for uss of the tern "dangerous" pattern. It is clear
that continued phased modernization of our tactical air
forces while maintaining current overall capability is
impossible given the concurrent requirements in other forces
and even the most optimistic budget projections. This acqui-
sition policy "forces" DOD managers into the tactical
aircraft replacement strategy they embrace: maximum tech-
nical substitution. One of the most frequently recalled
23


































930 I3«f0 1950 «9<>0 IS70 (980 /990
Year of initial operating capability
Figure 3.1 HISTORICAL OHIT COST ESCAIATIOIS - FIGHTEBS,
2U

SOURCE: White, W.D., U.S. Tactical Air Power , p. 57
1330 I9*f0 I9S0 I960 '970 (980 1990
Year of initial operating capability
Figure 3.2 HIST0BICA1 UHIT COST ESCALATIONS - ATTACK,
25

arguments supporting spiraling costs of new combat aircraft
is that they are produced at uneconomical rates, but the
author of a Brookings Institution study disagrees: [Hef. 6]
The argument that modern fighters seem more costly than
they really are because of the penalties imposed by
uneconomic production runs therefore confuses cause ana
effect. It is not so much that modern aircraft are so
costly because fewer are built as it is that fewer are
built because modern aircraft are so costly. Through the
constraint of total costs, production of fewer aircraft
becomes the pragmatic corollary to expensive aircraft
designs. The effects of lower production must be viewed
as a secondary, dependent factor in the cost
trend.. .This leaves increasing technical complexity,
manifest both in the growing size of the aircraft and in
the ever-greater precision and sophistication of their
component parts, as the principal explanation for the
upward trend in unit costs.
As indicated in the previous Chapter, pressure to reduce
these mounting costs was felt in the agency closest to the
resources and to the constituency providing those resources,
not in DOD where the services considered it their preroga-
tive to start planning from an optimistic, unrealistic base
and then to proceed toward the real budgetary guidance.
This mindset contained the seeds of its own destruction, and
widely-followed columnists referred to the first submissions
of the DOD budget as "wish lists". There were, in fact,
substantial pressures on DOD managers by 1974, but they were
not sufficient to prompt any change in strategy. Indeed,
despite annual assurances by the service chiefs that their
recommended new systems were the most cost effective solu-
tions to legitimate threats, a military service rarely
initiated development of a lower cost alternative to a
proposed new system. The procurement process itself seemed
incapable of any substantial change from what had become
business as usual - runaway costs, smaller-than-planned
procurements, higher unit costs and increasing sophistica-
tion- It remained for the Congress to take the initiative,




B. THE HIGH/LOW NIX CONCEPT DEFINED
Former Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt takes
personal credit for first using the expression high/low mix
to refer to his "Project 6 0", a major reprogramming effort
conducted during his first 60 days as CNO , although he had
advanced the concept under a different label many years
earlier as a staff officer in Washington. In the early
Zumwalt days it was a concept limited to the force mix of
combatant ships but by 1976 there were frequent references
to it in congressional hearings and in the aerospace trade
press on the subject of tactical aircraft force mixes. DOD
references to it for ether than Navy ship procurements were
almost nonexistent, the acquisition process itself had
difficulty accommodating any tactical air strategy that did
not embrace the principle of 100% maximum technical substi-
tution. [Ref. 7]
The high/low mix concept is a simple one in theory:
whenever it is most cost effective to do so and whenever
appropriate candidates are available, acquisition managers
should select the best mix of lower cost, less capable
systems and higher cost, more sophisticated systems to
satisfy an operational requirement or requirements. The
difficulties lie in the meaning of the term cost effective
as it relates to tactical aircraft. This is itself a major
task, and as William White points out in his study, the
process may eliminate a legitimate lower cost alternative
from further consideration: [Eef. 8].
Although the potential for reducing battle casualties
may be the strongest argument for continuing the tradi-
tional U.S. philosophy of pressing the limits of tech-
nology in weapons development and procurement, the usual
test in deciding whether a specific new system should be
procured is that of dollars-and-cents cost effective-
ness. Does the new system offer enough extra capability
to justify its (typically) greater cost? Even with the
simplest weapon systems, a precise answer to this
straightforward question can prove tantalizingly
elusive. With cemplex systems such as tactical
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warplanes, concrete conclusions about economicjustification are seldom if ever attainable. In this
atmosphere of uncertainty the traditional practice of
tne United States in equipping its military forces seems
to award the benefit of the doubt to innovation and the
new weapon. .. Because of the singular difficulty the
analyst encounters in trying to measure military 'out-
put 1 (or even finding a quantifiable definition of what
it is that 0. S. armed forces produce) , it cannot be
demonstrated conclusively that this approach has been
economic, let alone optimal. Obviously it has not led to
lower defense budgets or fewer men in uniform.
What appears to be a recipe for decision makers is
instead a very complicated, difficult process of determining
first what the requirement is and should be, then fashioning
that requirement into a request for response from industry,
and finally choosing the "best mix" from among candidates
which provides the most cost effective use of of the
resources made available to defense. At each step in the
process there are pitfalls; bias and favoritism can enter
the process, and seriously flawed assumptions can skew the
data and resulting analysis. It is extraordinary that many
excellent decisions do, in fact, result from the process.
Chapter VII examines that process, although a somewhat modi-
fied version, in the Enforcer/A-10 analysis. Whether or not
its sponsors ever ever intended it to be considered in a
high/lew mix context, the fact is that the "usual test" was
applied and the benefit of the doubt was awarded to the
"new" weapon, but not necessarily to the most innovative.
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17. EMFOBCEH, A LOi COST ALTEE NATIVE
A. EARLY CONCEPT FORMULATION AND SPONSORSHIP
Mr- David B. Lindsay, Jr. is a former newspaper owner-
publisher from Sarasota, Florida- He has been flying since
1941 and is active in the restoration and flying of high
performance florid War II aircraft, especially the P-51
Mustang- During 1957 his company, Cavalier Aircraft, began
rebuilding and modernizing surplus Mustangs for the civilian
market. Some friendly foreign nations expressed an interest
and in the early 1960 , s Cavalier Aircraft was delivering
Mustang conversions to the Air Force for sale under the
Military Assistance Program as trainers and counterinsur-
gency aircraft. This was a very modest program, never oper-
ating in the black for Cavalier. Mr. Lindsay, a student of
tactical air warfare, saw a great potential in the Mustang
concept as a close air support system. Two things encouraged
Mr. Lindsay to take his concept beyond a purely academic
exercise. The first was a requirement within DOD in 1969 for
a new close air support (c.a.s.) system to be deployed in
the mid-1970's. The requirement was driven by a worldwide
threat but with an emphasis on the perceived Soviet/Warsaw
Pact threat in central Europe. The second was a speech
delivered earlier by then Deputy Secretary of Defense
Packard encouraging private entrepreneurs to come forward
with innovative concepts and prototype weapon systems. His
verbal call for offers was backed by language in the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations (A. 3-P.fi.) which made
provisions for higher profitability potential and protection
from competition for developers of weapon systems funded
entirely within the private sector. These A.S.P.R. incen-
tives are discussed in several of the following chapters.
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Mr. Lindsay designed and built a substantially modified
Cavalier Mustang around the P-51 airframe called the
Enforcer- In 1970 he demonstrated it to interested civilian
and military managers at various locations on the east
coast, With the lessons learned from this 100 flight-hour
effort he returned to the drawing boards and designed a
newer Enforcer around a different, much-improved engine.
This version s
s
aught the attention of Piper Aircraft, and it
bought the entire project including rights, patents, draw-
ings, prototype and spare parts from Mr. Lindsay in 1970.
Mr. Lindsay was retained without compensation as a
consultant to Piper. The terms involved a small down
payment and a modest profit-sharing agreement if and when
production commenced. As the transfer of hardware and data
from Cavalier to Piper began, Piper accepted an Air Force
Request for Proposal (RFP) . It was an invitation for partic-
ipation in PAVE COIN, an unfunded demonstration to the Air
Force of candidates for a new counterinsurgency aircraft. A
parallel effort to identify candidates for a new light
utility aircraft was included. The winner of the counterin-
surgency competition could also ba expected to replace the
aging Douglas A-1 SJcyraider in the Vietnamization program.
[Ref. 9]
Piper, with Mr. Lindsay as an advisor, confidently
entered the competition. They relied on the good faith of
the Air Force and on the language of the RFP which implied
that the winner of the PAVE COIN competition would be
awarded a contract for a minimum of four hundred aircraft.
Piper estimated it could build four hundred fully equipped
Enforcers for a 1971 flyaway cost of $610,000 each. The
Enforcer was a hands-down winner, no other counterinsurgency
entrants could meet all of the minimum requirements, yet no
procurement contract was ever awarded. Each of the industry
participants in PAVE C0IN»s counterinsurgency aircraft
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competition lost 100% of its investment. With the exception
of Enforcer, all entrants were production aircraft entered
at little risk to their manufacturers. Piper estimated its
loss at a million dollars.
In 1969, two years prior to PAVE COIN,
Eepublic-Fairchild Corporation's A- 10 prototype won a fly off
against Northrop's prototype, designated the A-9, and was
awarded a coa tract for full scale development of the next
Air Force primary mission c.a.s. aircraft. The A-10, in
various proposed production schemes, was moderately priced.
1975 SAR data indicates a current proposed production run of
733 aircraft at a unit flyaway cost of $2.23 million. It was
a relatively sophisticated system capable of day or night
close air support against a NATO worst-case scenario, a full
scale heavy tank assault which is discussed in the next
chapter. The A-10 was optimized for that worst-case scen-
ario, a scenario whose associated operational requirement
was written by the ultimate end-user of the aircraft, the
Air Force. There are two important points to consider at
this stage in Enforcer's story. Tha first is that at the
conclusion of PAVE CCIN in 1971 with the A-10 program early
in its full scale development phase, The Enforcer was not
being considered by its private sector sponsors as a solu-
tion to any existing specific operational requirement (s)
.
They viewed it as an innovative aircraft capable of effec-
tively performing some of the mission elements common to the
DOD definition of close air support at a relatively low
cost. The second is that the A-10 program, when compared to
other tactical or strategic aircraft programs in the defense
budget at the time (F-14, C-5) , was itself a relatively low
cost, high quantity system, although much more sophisticated
than the various aircraft then performing its mission.
Compared with Enforcer, however, it belonged squarely on the
high side of any conceivable "mix" of the two, if one
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accepts th€ concept defi nition of high/low mix presented in
Chapter III.
Piper aircraft, assisted by Mr- Lindsay, saw an opportu-
nity to recoup its PAVE COIN loss and to keep the Enforcer
program moving ahead. It proposed Enforcer not as a substi-
tute or direct alternative to the A-10, but as a complement,
a lower cost alternative system to be added to the c.a.s.
inventory. [Ref- 10]. Aside from the fact that this
implied an additional increment to the c.a.s. mission area
budget line, it was, in fact. being proposed as the low end
in a high/low mix.
B. INITIAL EHFOBCEB CONFIGURATION
The uniqueness of the Enforcer presents a formidable
task for an analyst trying to compare it with existing or
proposed aircraft in the DOD inventory. It is easiest to
initially consider it in total isolation. The Enforcer is
34.2 feet long with a wing span of 41.3 feet and a wing area
of 257 sq. faet. Its maximum takeoff weight is 14,0001b.,
normal landing weight is 12,340 lb. and it has a maximum
payload of 5,680 lb. Fuel capacity is 424 gallons including
two 120 gallon tip tanks. Its design speed maximum is 350
knots with the current engine configuration, an Avco
Lycoming T55-L-9A rated at 2,445 shaft horsepower turning an
Aero Products 11.5 foot diameter four-blade propellor.
Combat radius is approximately 400 nautical miles. It was
optimized for day, fair weather close support operations
against a lightly mechanized enemy infantry assault. This
mission element was only an incidental part of the then
current Air Force operational requirement for close support.
Again, Chapter V discusses the entire requirement and the
threats generating it. The following Piper Air-raft Company
list of Enforcer's early configuration and characteristics
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is useful for identifying the void its manufacturer hoped it
would fill:
- Uniquely fills operational spectrum between armed
helicopter and pure jet- More armor per pound of airframe
weight than aay aircraft in the world. Uncomplicated arma-
ment controls, within peripheral view of the pilot-.
a
Lindsay patent.
- Smallest silhouette, lowest infrared signature, lowest
noise level, fastest acceleration and highest survivability
of any attack aircraft.
- Engine hot section forward of all flammable liquids.
- Lycoming T-55 same basic engine as Army's CH-47
Chinook. Army holding as excess more than 300 of these
engines removed from Chinooks for replacement with larger
engine.
- Large worldwide market already identified by DOD.
- Six 50 caliber (12.7 mm) machine guns with 2000 rounds
of ammunition, internally in wings. Optionally, two 20 mm
3-barrel GE Gatling guns-
Ten under wing stations for all standard inventory
ordnance, including missiles.
- Hide speed range (78-403 knots) and high maneuver-
ability permit operations under low cloud ceilings, in moun-
tainous areas, and under its own flares at night.
- Performance proven by tests of flying prototype. .not
theoretically projected




- Capable of operating from short, unprepared fields in
combat zone to obtain common fuel and ammunition from ground
units.
- World's only jet turbine powered, propellor-driven,
low/high threat close support aircraft.
- Uniquely low fuel consumption conserves critical fuel
supplies and gives lcnger loiter time.
First U.S. combat aircraft designed, built and
privately tested without any government financing, (authors'
note: still the first)
- Developed especially for direct fire support of ground
troops (close air support, classical definition)
All-alloy aluminum construction permits low price,
guantity buys, and field repair. (authors' note; the armor
in critical areas is also field repairable)
- Projected low initial cost, extremely low operations
and maintenance time and costs (less than $150/flying hour)
resulting in high in-ccmmission rate
- ferryable world-wide without air-to-air refueling
- Simplicity guarantees ease of pilot and ground crew
training, plus effective utilization in all countries.
SOURCE: Piper Aircraft presentation to congressional
subcommittees in 1974 and 1975
These were Enforcer's calling cards, but only a few of
the above performance characteristics had been demonstrated
by prototype flights. With no specific operational require-
ment (0. E.) for an Enforcer-type aircraft in 1971, it was
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clearly handicapped in any attempt to move into the acquisi-
tion process. This handicap also enjoyed no offsetting
military service sponsorship. Without a constituency of its
own it appeared to have little chance for serious considera-
tion at DOD.
C. ZAB1I C0NSRESSI01AL SUPPORT
The only additional source of sponsorship available to
Enforcer following PAVE COIN was in Congress. As a privately
developed weapon system not involved in formal competition
or negotiation at DOD, Enforcer could not capture the atten-
tion of even the most cost-conscious managers there. The
period 1970-1974 was marked by personal lobbying by Mr.
Lindsay who was joined by Mr. Helms, the new president of
Piper, early in 1974. They visited contacts at DOD and
elicited more sympathy than enthusiasm. The acquisition
system proviied no incentives whatsoever for formal DOD
consideration of this unsolicited new system, regardless of
its credentials. Within Congress, however, and particularly
in the Senate at this time, the pressures for cost reduction
discussed in Chapters II and III were very real. Mr.
Lindsay, in particular, was able to begin to generate active
interest in the Enforcer in a series of informal hearings at
the subcommittee levels. Some personal friendships were
involved, but that is an acknowledged and legitimate way of
opening doors in Congress and has little bearing on this
case. Mr. Lindsay was not a highly paid lobbyist for a major
defense contractor, he had a very personal stake in the
Enforcer's future and some of the most powerful members of
the Senate found this refreshing after hours of contractor
testimony on the huge overruns then occurring in major
defense programs. The Enforcer weapon system had a legiti-
macy of its own and could conceivably have been brought to
those hearings by someone unknown to the Senators involved.
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The early hearings, up to 1974, were no more than a
discussion stage. Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Helms sought only to
have Enforcer subjected to rigorous testing by one or more
of the services. Some informal inquiries were made by a few
members of the Senate to various levels at DOD, but they
failed to make any progress toward elevating Enforcers
present status as an interesting modest experiment within
the private sector. There is a certain sanctity within
defense systems acquisitions that is respected even by those
with the power to advance or deny resources, a tangible
evidence that weapon systems selections are usually best
left to those who know the system best, the end users. The
real congressional micro-management of the defense procure-
ment arena was concentrated in the myriad problems occurring
after the award of a production contract.
By late 1974, however, the country was trying to shake
off the effects of a deep recession. Cost overrun "horror
stories" in the C-5, F-14, and other acquisition programs
were capturing headlines, and the mood in Congress was
changing to one of involvement in the earliest stages of a
system: alternative concept development and prototype devel-
opment. For Enforcer, this meant the transition between the
discussion stage and the examination stage over at DOD. This
transition period is addressed in Chapter VI.
0. IBITIAI MILITARY SEB7ICES RESPONSE
Between the conclusion of the PAVE COIN flights in
August 1971 and the more active examination stage in late
1974, exchanges between Congress and the services concerning
Enforcer were largely informal. The congressional testimony
from the period related to Enforcer indicates that while
some powerful senators in the Armed Services Committee were
keenly interested in the Enforcer concept, their interest
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was mostly in-house. The informal exchanges with senior DOD
managers lacked the tone of urgency which characterized
later specific taskings and that elusive sanctity mentioned
above was not being violated- There are references to three
"paper" studies conducted by groups with little or no like-
lihood of potential roles in any Enforcer acquisition deci-
sion. One study was conducted by the Joint Technical
Coordinating Sroup for Air Survivability. It assessed the
data on Enforcer's total combat survivability using only
written contractor specifications on the aircraft. The other
two were engiaeering studies conducted by the Marine Corps
and the Naval Air Systems Command. The Navy/Marine Corps
team was the least likely among the services to demonstrate
a requirement for any tactical aircraft that was not
aircraft carrier-compatible. Both sets of studies served to
validate Pipsr*s claims for the aircraft, within the
constraints of paper studies. They proved useful later on,
during the Air Force analysis aftermath discussed in
Chapters 711 md VIII. They were not significant factors in
the transition between discussion and examination which was
prompted more by environmental and economic factors than by
anything else. By mid- 197 4 the Air Force had not formally
commented on the Enforcer.
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V. THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSION
A. IHE DEFINITION VERSOS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
The Joint Chiefs cf Staff Dictionary contains the widely
accepted definition of close air support: [Ref. 11].
Air attacks against hostile targets which are in' close
proximity to rriendly forces and which require detailed
integration of each air mission with the fire and move-
ment of those forces.
DCD describes clcse air support operations as "call
fire" in response to direct requests from ground units or
through forward air controllers (FACs) . As these same
sources iray be calling simultaneously for artillery, good
liaiscn procedures between controllers and the clcse air
support aircraft are essential. Aircraft capable cf heavy
ordnance leads and low level operations must be able to
scramble quickly from nearby bases or be able to loiter in
the area on call. The zone cf operations tends to be no
deeper than five kilometers from friendly forces, hence
accuracy of weapens delivery is extremely important. While
large, mcbile surface-to-air missiles (SA3s) are possible in
this zone, they are less a threat than AAA and hand-held,
short-range Sktts. Fighter escort is usually not assigned,
though there may be general front coverage against raiding
aircraft.
,
Definitions serve a useful purpose, but they necessarily
fall short of providing planners and programmers with an
all-erccmpassing set cf specific threats against which seme
effective weapon system night he designed. Their purpose is
to define those characteristics of a mission area that are
universal. Close Air support in the 1973 Yom Kippur War was
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not the same as close air support in North Viet Nam or in
Korea. Each scenario was marked by distinctions which were
best countered by aircraft specifically tailored for it. The
hypothetical optimum tailoring might span a range from
simply different shades of camouflage paint on the same
aircraft to a totally different weapon system with different
ordnance # power plant, and base of operations. The task of
the military systems planner is to combine all possible
scenarios on paper and to try to state a required opera-
tional capability that counters every possible threat in
each scenario.
In Chapter II we referred to this task as a process of
transformation, the first step in the chain of events
between the realistically assessed threat and the selection
of a weapon system to counter it. Considerable flexibility
is available to the end users of weapon systems, the mili-
tary services, when they first set out to write or revise a
specific operational requirement (S.O.H.). Within broad and
usually optimistic resource constraints, the first cut tends
to be an idealized solution which would provide close to
100% assurance of successfully countering the threat (s).
This paper exercise of compiling what amounts to a wish list
might seem harmless enough, although wasteful of the
planner/programmer's time in view of fiscal realities. It
has the effect, however, of biasing the overall approach to
the problem in favor of the highly sophisticated alterna-
tive. There is a tendency to accept the basic premise of the
maximum capability (highest technology) idealized solution
as the starting point and to reduce its quantity and/or
stretch out its proposed production period as budget
constraints are applied. In other words, before any lower
cost alternatives can be considered the process must first
accommodate the widest acceptable range of cost-controlling
options in the idealized solution, a methodology that will
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favor or prioritize the idealized choice. As discussed in
previous chapters, the trend during the 1960 f s and 1970's
was to find an accommodation at some point before considera-
tion of a lower cost alternative was ever reached. For some
threats, this methodology may actually provide the best
choice possible. The application of constraints to a system
the services would prefer to have is a healthy process and
still produces a very capable system, although possibly in
insufficient quantities or with underfunded support if inap-
propriate cost reductions were applied.
The importance of the wording of the operational
requirement cannot be overemphasized, for it can be weighted
to prioritize a threat element that is either of low prob-
ability or that can only be countered by a system favored by
the writer of the S.O.E. For example, whether or not it can
be shown that a "second best" selection decision resulted,
the S.O.R. against which the A-10 was selected was tailored
to a worst-case scenario for which the A-10 was optimized.
Chapter VII examines the consequences of this sort of
tailoring in the Air Force sponsored Enforcer cost effec-
tiveness evaluation.
A. EZISTIIG 3L0SE AIB SUPPORT PROGRAMS
A brief review of the variety of aircraft in production
or proposed during the 197 0*s with a primary or secondary
close air support mission is appropriate at this point. They
range from aircraft which were simple and inexpensive enough
to be considered "throwaway" systems relative to some
others, to the most costly and complex tactical aircraft
ever produced. They involve different military services,
different operational requirements, different program sizes
and vastly different capabilities. They are presented to
remind the reader that when the military services are taken
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as an entity, high ccst and high technology solutions to the
c-a.s. problem were clearly not the only way to go.
The A-4 Skyhawk was phased out of Navy tactical air
units by 1976, but it remained in the Marine Corps inventory
as a close air support and deep interdiction aircraft.
Marines base their A-4 units on land, as near as possible to
the fighting forces, but the aircraft are capable of carrier
operations. Special purpose Marine airfields using SATS gear
(catapult and arresting gear) enable the A-4 to operate out
of small unprepared fields. Its proposed replacement in the
1970* s was what is now the F/A-18 Hornet, a highly sophisti-
cated dual-role aircraft. It can be readily converted from
its fighter configuration to an attack platform capable of
both deep interdiction and close air support missions.
Carrier-based units will perform in both roles. It can be
air refueled for extended-range interdiction missions. The
Marine Corps also employed its AV-8A Harriers, introduced
early in the 1970's, in a close air support primary mission
role. When air refueled it can be used in a secondary role
as a deep interdiction weapon and has some self-protection
capability if fighter escort coverage is not available. The
Harrier trades off range and payload performance for the
unique capability to take off and land vertically, in
totally unprepared landing areas. Other Navy and Marine
aircraft capable of close air support missions are the A-7E
Corsair and the A-6E Intruder, earlier versions of which
were in the active carrier-based inventory in the 1970 's-
The A-7 is designated a light attack aircraft and can
perform both deep interdiction and close air support
missions with self-protection afforded by AIM-9 Sidewinder
missiles and a 20 mm GE Satling internal cannon. It will
also be phased out with the introduction of the F/A-18. The
A-6 Intruder is a medium attack aircraft in use in both the
Navy and the Harine Corps. It is capable of all-weather deep
41

interdiction and close air support, and carries the largest
payload of any Navy or Marine Corps attack aircraft. Both
the A-6 and A-7 series aircraft are air refuelable.
[Ref. 12]
Although each of the above aircraft have a close air
support capability and could conceivably be compared with an
Enforcer type aircraft with regard to airborne combat effec-
tiveness, (getting to and from the target, loiter, self-
protection, vulnerability, weapons loads, accuracy, etc.)
,
their common characteristic of aircraft carrier compati-
bility sets them completely apart. Carrier capabilities
place substantial additional demands on an airframe that are
translated into much higher costs, additional subsystems for
enhanced safety, structural improvements which add substan-
tial weight, and an overall additional measure of complexity
for all weather operations. The TFX (F— 111) experience was a
harsh reminder that carrier capabilities cannot be added as
an afterthought to an airframe designed primarily for land-
based operations. There was, of course, no intention by
Enforcer's designer or manufacturer to even suggest that it
could be made carrier capable in the future. Since the paper
studies in print as of 1974 suggested that there might be a
place in the DOD inventory for Enforcer, its lack of carrier
capability left only the Army or Air Force as a possible
sponsor. The Army, however, had deferred to the Air Force in
the fixed-wing close air support mission as a matter of
doctrine, a doctrine that was unchallenged in the 1970*3.
The Air Force has several aircraft capable of close air
support which were in service or proposed during the 1970's.
Their multi-purpose (but not carrier capable) A-7D performs
both close air support and deep interdiction missions. It is
optimized for the latter, with state-of- the-art digital
avionics, inertial navigation, and computerized weapons
release systems. The F-4 Phantom, primarily an all-weather
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interceptor, has a limited c.a.s. capability but its inter-
ceptor design characteristics (for supersonic flight) make
it less suitable than most for the mission. The A-37E, a
variant of their primary jet trainer, was capable of light
attack and close proximity air support. The OV-10, a
forward air control/light utility aircraft, was only margi-
nally suited for very limited close air support. On the
other hand, the A-10, which was in early full scale develop-
ment in 1974, was a specialized primary mission close air
support platform also capable of a limited deep interdiction
role. Although much more sophisticated than Enforcer, its
speed range and weapons variety were roughly comparable.
Chapter VII presents its characteristics in detail.
Regardless of the appropriateness, if there were to be a
comparison at all between Enforcer and any other aircraft in
active service or proposed by 1974, it would have to be with
the first pure-jet aircraft designed as a primary mission
c.a.s. platform, the A-10. £Ref. 13]
B. PROJECTED CAS EIVTBONHENT
By 1974 the attrition statistics from the Yom Kippur War
had been analyzed by planners all over the world. The effec-
tiveness of some of the newer Soviet SAM systems and anti-
aircraft batteries caught the attention of analysts,
programmers, and, perhaps more significantly, military
pilots here and abroad. tf hen the material loss statistics
from that brief but intense war were superimposed on the
NATO central European scenario the meaning was ominous: NATO
forces would have to gain the upper hand over advancing
enemy forces on the ground by the fifth day of the invasion
or there would not be sufficient general purpose forces
remaining in NATO to prevail.
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While NATO defense ministers wrestled with the diplo-
matic efforts associated with mutually balanced force reduc-
tions between themselves and the Warsaw Pact, operational
commanders, more concerned with the ability to win after a
failure of diplomacy, faced some very difficult choices.
Appropriate force levels to counter the postulated massive
assault capability from the east required nearly unaccep-
tably high buildups of NATO conventional ground and air
forces in both quality and quantity .The option to resort to
tactical nuclear weapons was a controversial one, a last-
resort contingency seme of the NATO nations refused to even
consider. The debate over whether nuclear weapons have any
tactical applicability at all or whether their use would
almost immediately trigger the use of strategic weapons will
continue long after current generations of general purpose
weapons have been retired. What is significant is that
despite the worldwide outcry there remained enough pressure
on conventional forces' capabilities that by 197 4 there were
plans for tactical nuclear weapons to become an important
part of the defensive force composition, and ultimately to
be a part of the offensive arm, on both sides.
The quality versus quantity debate thrives in this NATO
Europe scenario. Even the countries willing to host nuclear
weapons want their conventional weapons capability to be
strong enough to minimize the chance of a last resort
employment of the nuclear weapons. The question is how to
arrive at that position of strength. The close air support
environment in which NATO forces might operate is extremely
lethal. It can be used to argue for either aQ increase of
A-10's or for a mix with Enforcer type aircraft. A variety
of threats and weather conditions can be predicted,
depending on the nature of the enemy's thrust. What is known
with certainty, however, is that the enemy has the capa-
bility to strike in great numbers with a wide range of
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general purpose forces. The following testimony on the
subject of c.a.s in NATO Europe illustrates both the seri-
ousness of the threat and the complexity of the range of
responses: [Bef. 14].
First, it is clear that the effects of inflation and the
increasing sophistication of aircraft weapons systems
have made the price of most of the weapons now under
consideration for close support cost so many millions of
dollars each that it may be impossible to acquire a
sufficient number of them to provide the credibility,
both to our allies and to our enemies, that only large
numbers can assure. ..Second, it is known that the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact nations have four times as
many tanks as the United States and its NATO allies, and
at least fire times our tank poduction rate. They are
also 40 per cent ahead of us in tactical aircraft
numbers, which they are producing at double our own
rate. In addition, their anti-aircraft defenses are
deployed in greater numbers. .. The first three days of a
Pact attack on Europe probably would determine the
outcome of a conflict. Many people are deeply disturbed
at the apparent reliance of the Pentagon on tactical
nuclear weapons, which would seem to result from a
Eaucity of alternatives. .. Anotner point on which I
elieve we can achieve agreement is that the Soviet
weaponry which was first revealed in the October 1973
war in the liddle East has caused a drastic reevaluation
of the close air support role as to surviv-
ability.. -Today, there is general agreement that
pinpoint close air support will have to be performed
with standoff weaponry of the f ire-and-forget variety,
such as missiles or long range guns, or with extremely
low level delivery of cluster-bomb weapons.
45

71- SEARCH FOE A SPONSOR
A. CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE
In Chapter IV we stated that environmental and economic
factors, not the validation studies, were the catalyst to
move the Enforcer initiative from discussion to examination.
Those factors (recession, cost overruns, etc.) have been
discussed earlier. By the late summer of 1974 a sense of
urgency was apparent in those subcommittees which had been
patiently listening to the Enforcer testimony. The valida-
tion studies all tended to focus on the Air Force as a
potential sponsor, and the Air Force was the last to respond
to informal congressional prodding with their analysis.
During this period the Air Force was mobilizing support for
an A- 10 production decision in the face of a final hour
congressional effort to reconsider the A-7. Pressure from
the Texas congressional delegation (A-7's were produced in
Dallas by the LTV Corporation) forced a new competitive
flyoff which delayed a final production start for the
winner, the A-10. With this end run threatening to erase
years of dedicated acquisition effort in the A- 10 project
office, it was not surprising that the close air support
program managers considered the Enforcer program's congres-
sional interest to be a low priority. [Ref. 15]
Formal contact with DOD concerning the Enforcer began in
July 1974 with a series of letters from various powerful
committee members to high level DOD officials. The theme of
the correspondence was consistent - the authors believed in
the Enforcer concept and urged the recipients to consider a
modest test program of the latest Enforcer version under DOD
auspices. Coincident with these first letters, the Air Force
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initiated its own analysis on the Air Staff and within the
Aeronautical Systems Division of their Systems Command. This
comprehensive analysis, presented in the next chapter,
became an intaresting paradox for the Enforcer's supporters
in Congress: DOD officials delayed in responding to the
early test requests while the Air Force analysis was being
completed. This delay annoyed the requesters as indicated in
the tone of their followup letters, yet the final responses
from DOD cited the analysis results as the reason testing
would not be considered.
The following excerpts from the above-mentioned letters
mirror the sense of frustration on Capitol Hill. The first,
dated July 19th # 1974, was addressed to then Secretary of
Defense Schlesinger and was signed by Senate Armed Services
Committee members Senators Proxmire, Thurmond, Hclntyre,
Tower and Jackson: [fief. 16].
Zou have recently asked for the cooperation of Congress
in holding down defense costs. As members of the Senate,
intensely interested not only in the economy but also
military effectiveness, we strongly recommend that you
personally initiate action to test fly the Enforcer
close air support aircraft. ..It is our belief that the
Enforcer promises such an attractive combination of
economy and effectiveness that it should not be cast
aside by service biases...
After four months without a response, the same senators
signed a terse followup dated November 7th: [Ref. 17],
As of this day we have received no reply from you. This
raises the question about how seriously the Defense
Department considers the declining level/rising costs
dilemma.. .Once again we ask for your reply. Why should
this aircraft not be flight tested?
After the results of the Air Force analysis were avail-
able. Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements responded to the
above two letters with the following reply dated January
3rd, 1975: [Hef. 18].
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Dear Mr- Chairman: This responds to your letters recom-
mending that the Department of Defense test fly the Enforcer
aircraft- First, let me assure you that we are constantly
seeking systems which will provide effective combat capa-
bility at reduced cost: our Air Combat Fighter Program isjust one such example- The Enforcer proposal has been exten-
sively reviewed against these criteria- These reviews
conclusively establish that there is no place for such an
aircraft in the Department of Def ense- . - The Air Force has
recently completed an extremely thorough review of Enforcer
capabilities, combat configurations, development and produc-
tion requirements and vulnerability- These data have been
used as the basis for comprehensive analyses of the
aircraft*s effectiveness in the type of combat environment
described in your letters. These analyses accepted uncriti-
cally all the designees claims for payload and weapons
system effectiveness- We believe that this Air Force study
clearly establishes that: the Enforcer is not the optimal,
and certainly not the only, aircraft of its type; this type
of aircraft is not well suited to provide close air support
in a tank-doninated battlefield; and - for a specified
combat task - it costs more to get the job done with this
type of aircraft than with other aircraft now available- -.
I
recognize your interest in actual flight test data; however
the Enforcer presents no technical unknowns and its capabil-
ities are easily determinable with great confidence. No data
resulting from a flight test would impact on the factors
which provide a basis for our conclusions. 3ecause of this,
we cannot justify or support a request to expend funds to
provide redundant or unnecessary data. -.In view of your
interest in the Enforcer aircraft, I suggest that you may
wish to be briefed on the Air Force study- I understand that
Dr. McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force, has already offered
to arrange such a briefing at your convenience.
This response would seem, to most readers, to close the
books on the Enforcer. With the exception of politically
motivated "end runs" such as that with the A-7, the Congress
seldom became involved to this degree with weapon systems
not yet in production. They are intimately involved, of
course, in the entire acquisition cycles of the few major
systems presented each year such as the Trident submarine or
the MX missile - these programs elicit national attention
and arouse even the most apathetic taxpayer's curiosity- But
the majority of programs of the size of the close air
support aircraft program are nearly lost in the noise until
there are visible problems in production. Congress usually
sided with Defense in early program decisions such as the
A-10 go-aheai. Shat may have been different about the
Enforcer was the magnetism and tenacity of its designer and
his persuasiveness while lobbying for its acceptance.
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B. PBIVATE SECTOR IBYOL7EMENT
Mr, David Lindsay was not completely discouraged by the
results of the Air Force analysis which follow in Chapter
711. He knew he had won some powerful friends over to the
Enforcer concept and that it would not die of neglect after
the computer study and Air Force decision not to consider
it for further testing. Instead of giving up he became even
more determined and gathered together a briefing group
consisting of Mr. Helms, the ex-military pilots who had
flown the Enforcer for Piper in PAVE COIN, the British armor
manufacturer, and the engine manufacturer. Many of the
members of ths subcommittees he had briefed and their staffs
now knew mora about the Enforcer concept than some of the
Air Force managers assigned to its analysis and these
committee members were just as annoyed as Mr. Lindsay that
the Air Porce chose to compare the Enforcer witn the A-10 in
the A-10's special and demanding scenario. Whether or not
the Air Forze* s hands were tied by the passion for
computer-generated cost effectiveness analyses in the
Pentagon, there were too many senators who were tired of
explaining to their constituents why costs of existing
systems always seemed to exceed earlier computer-generated
estimates. In an unusual gesture of support from their
friends in Congress, Messrs. Helms and Lindsay and their
team were invited to appear before several subcommittees to
testify on their own behalf. Mr. Lindsay himself was given
carte blanche when he was introduced by Congressman Price to
members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Research
and Development with the following remark: [ Bef . 19].
Air Force presented its findings during November and it
is my understanding that Mr. Lindsay is not in full
agreement with some of the data presented. At this time
you may begin this morning's program and present the
committee wLth any new data or information that you feel
is pertinent to the Enforcer....
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It is essential to see what was occurring here. An
aircraft designer, no longer even owner of the rights to
that aircraft, was allowed to brief influential members of
the subcommittee with information that they knew would
discredit a study in which the service secretary had
concurred. This was a courtesy seldom extended even to the
giants of aerospace industries and an indication of the
special status they reserved for Enforcer and its original
owner/designer. Mr- Lindsay*s remarks and those of the
others on the briefing team will be discussed as part of the
reaction to the Air Force analysis in Chapter VIII. What is
important is that this team was immediately brought back
before congressional supporters who clearly were dissatis-
fied with the continuing lack of sponsorship at DOD. Some
Senators even proposed a face-to-face session between the
Air Force and the Enforcer industry contingent before the
subcommittee. It seemed they were almost forcing the issue
into the limelight, giving the Enforcer a life of its own
when all of their powers of persuasion with DOD senior offi-
cials had failed. These face-to-face briefings never
occurred, nevertheless the friction, at least between
members of Congress and the Air Force, is clear from a
lively session in the summer of 1975 when the Air Force
briefed the study in a partly classified session. This
session will also be discussed in chapter VIII.
C THE PPBS VERSUS ElFOflCEH
As the Enforcer program moved into the more active exam-
ination stage immediately following the Air Force analysis,
a problem surfaced which remained unresolved for several
years. It was noted that Enforcer was "born" partly out of
what Mr. Lindsay correctly perceived as encouragement from
Deputy Defense Secretary Packard 1 s call for private sector
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innovation- The language of the Armed Services Procurement
Eegulations in this regard is complex and subject to various
interpretations- While there is supposed to be protection of
proprietary rights and waiver of some of the usual provi-
sions concerning release of data, competition, patent owner-
ship, etc., for unsolicited private sector system proposals,
questions were being raised in the case of Enforcer. Much
of the profit potential associated with the sole source
designation would be lost if Enforcer were subject to the
competitive procurement procedures before prototypes could
be built. This legal "skirmish" will be discussed in Chapter
VIII as part of the Air Force responses to the questions
raised by the Enforcer industry contingent.'
Still another vexing problem which has been mentioned
several times previously was actually tied to Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System provisions. This anomaly,
whimsically referred to as the "not invented here" syndrome
by Mr. Lindsay in earlier testimony, is counter to the
intent of Packard's remarks and of the protective clauses in
the A.S-P. E. alluded to above. It is the bureacratic
approach to the Enforcer's lack of sponsorship, and was best
described by Mr. Lindsay himself before the House Armed
Services R&D Subcommittee: [Ref. 20].
We are at the point today where the Pentagon has been
forced to admit that the Enforcer will do all we have
claimed, and at a very Idw acquisition cost. The bar now
to operational flight tests is a remarkable conclusion,
that because there is no sponsoring service, there is
therefore no •requirement 1 tor the aircraft. We are thus
back to square one: there was no official 'requirement
•
when our efforts began but a very obvious need. That
need becomes clearer daily as studies indicated the
necessity of supplementing sophisticated and expensive
systems.
It seemed Mr. Lindsay and his group would be overwhelmed
by conflicting regulations with interpretations that could
be fashioned to the problem at hand, but both technicalities
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were ultimately resolved. Congress was not in a mood to
allow the services to avoid the tougher questions by citing




VII. THE AIB FORCE ANALYSIS
A. TACTICAL AIBCRAFT COHBAI MODELING
The true test of any piece of military hardware comes
with the adverse conditions presented in a military battle.
The battlefield, the ultimate testing ground, is also the
least desirable environment in which to test a new piece of
hardware. Testing and evaluation must be carried out prior
to engaging the enemy to detect and correct weaknesses prior
to battle-
Alternate approaches such as simulation allow the evalu-
ation of a weapon system to occur without suffering actual
combat losses. The "most likely" environment must be simu-
lated through mathematical models which attempt to quantify
weapons effectiveness and attrition rates against expected
enemy defenses. Simulation, the primary method for develop-
ment and evaluation, cannot measure the full capability of a
weapon system. Spinney cautions analysts against total
reliance on quantitative analysis: [fief. 21].
Capability, like complexity, is a quality of the •whole'
ana it can never be described by a single number. Recall
from Generals Clark's and Napoleon's statements that the
synthesis of men and machines into a military capability
involves very important intangible considerations —
e.g. moral strength, esprit de corps, skill, etc. Any
evaluation that ignores these intangibles is at best a
very partial and, by necessity, an ambiguous view.
The acid test of war is ultimately the only unambiguous
indicator of capability. Moreover, the lessons of combat
continue to be difficult to interpret. All other indicators
or measures are ambiguous because they are based upon specu-
lation about a future interaction between forces whose self
interest and survival dictate that they act and react
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unpredictably. (note: if you are predictable, you are vuln-
erab le. ) We can reduce part of this uncertainty througn
testing and training, but we can never remove its dominant
aspects. Perceptions of capability will always be shrouded
by a veil of speculation and ambiguity. How does one compute
the effectiveness of esprit de corps? [ Ref . 22]
Although the modeling approach to design and evaluation
of a weapon system is not as accurate as might be desired,
it presents a starting point or basis from which the weapon
system can he built and evaluated. To design a model for
the close air support mission, for example, it is first
necessary to determine the scenario. Given a scenario,
aircraft are then postulated that could counter and elimi-
nate the various threats within the scenario. This is the
"transformation" from threat to program discussed in
previous chapters and includes the creation of a specific
operational requirement. This was the approach taken in the
design of the A- 10 aircraft to meet the U.S. Air Force close
air support requirements.
As discussed in Chapter V, a reorientation to a European
scenario was a characteristic of planning in 1974. NATO
forces must be able to counter any Soviet thrust before its
momentum builds up to the point where it will overwhelm the
ground forces. NATO tactical aircraft losses will be consid-
erable in this scenario, but they must be accepted if one
also accepts the criticality of the threat and the projected
short duration of the conflict. In 1974 it was U.S. policy
to place a high priority on support of the NATO forces in
central Europe. It follows, then, that attrition assumptions
are critical to the outcome of any simulations of the
NATO-Europe close air support scenario.
In studying the potential anti-aircraft threat in
Europe, one finds an assortment of radar SAMs, infrared SAMs
and radar-controlled AAA. The close air support attack is
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associated primarily with aircraft-carried 30 mm firing
passes against tanks. It has been demonstrated historically
that bombs are not as effective for use against tanks as are
aircraft-mounted 30 mm cannons- There is no substantial
evidence to the contrary as more and more experience is
gained- With an optimum slant range in a firing run of, for
example, 4000 feet for the GAU-8 30 mm cannon (with the
aircraft at approximately 1400 feet above ground level)
,
attacking close support aircraft can expect to be exposed to
all three anti-aircraft threats above. This is "dirty work"
in the Air Force jargon- The high concentration of such
systems in the Warsaw Pact will take a heavy toll among
attacking NAT3 c.a.s. aircraft, especially in the low alti-
tude regime from which the most effective attacks are
commenced. Miller sums up the problem in a 1975 article:
[Ref. 23].
Viewing the anti-aircraft order-of -battle in east and
central Europe it is apparent that NATO will be taking
very heavy losses in close-air-support operations behind
enemy lines. Air Power does offer the capability to
strike the massing enemy prior to the enemy^s attack in
force. NATO must, however, be prepared to accept high
aircraft losses to effect a neutralization, or at least
blunting of the enemy armoured striking forces- NATO's
air forces then, must select the optimum aircraft (s) to
maximize the damage to the enemy while minimizing the
cost to NATO-
One can expect attacking enemy armored units to lose some of
their anti-aircraft capability as they advance into friendly
territory- This is due to the normal logistical strains put
on any attacking forces as they advance because of the
accompanying lengthening of the distance from the source of
supply. There is a paradox here: the enemy forces are more
vulnerable as they advance, but they are closer to critical
positions being defended; conversely if the defending anti-
tank aircraft are directed at armored units beyond the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) into enemy territory.
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those aircraft will suffer high losses. They will also
blunt/neutralize the enemy 1 s attacking strike force.
Although there has been considerable interest in, and
advancement of, anti-tank weaponry such as the TOW missile
and the GAD-8 30 mm cannon, the Soviets still build a
striking force around tanks, and have placed more and more
reliance on them.
NATO finds itself in a position of facing a potential
enemy bent on maintaining the offensive. Anti-tank aircraft
offer NATO the option of blunting this massive enemy attack
capability before the full offensive weight can fall on its
ground forces.
The analyst must consider weather factors in addition to
the preceding enemy tactics assumptions. The limiting effect
of typical weather in the European intertheater is substan-
tial. There are simply too many days during which tactical
air power would be useless if the payloads consisted
entirely of "smart bombs", cluster type bombs (rockeye) and
air to ground missiles. Even if they could find the enemy
armored positions in bad weather, pilots would often be
unable to achieve the release parameters of the above
weapons.
On the other hand, 30 mm cannon-equipped aircraft are in
many cases already below the weather because of the weapon*
s
optimum effective firing slant range of 4000 feet, placing
the aircraft 80 0-150 feet above ground level depending on
the dive angle. Analysts for O.S. forces favored the General
Electric GAU-8 and the Hughes-Oerlikon model 34 pod from
among those available in the mid-1970's.
Scenario, weather and weapons must be fitted to the
model. Fcr comparison between aircraft, the effectiveness
model would examine each through all phases of its combat
missions and estimate the probability of completing each
phase- For close air support, the aircraft might be required
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to 1) take off from a surviving case, 2) retain in-flight
reliability, 3) survive enemy action, and 4) return to a
surviving rase. £Ref. 24]. When the final outcome of a
battle is determined through computer simulation, the
overall cost-to- kill ratio would be imputed and weighted for
each aircraft. The aircraft with the lowest cost-to-kill
ratio would, mathematically at least, be the lowest cost
option.
NATO doesn't have unlimited air resources, and the most
efficient and effective use of available assets is neces-
sary. In some important ways the number of aircraft in
service is irrelevant; what counts is how many sorties can
be generated and how quickly. For example, in many c.a.s.
scenarios, a squadron with ten aircraft capable of five
sorties each per day is more effective than a twenty- plane
squadron whose aircraft can only fly twice a day. This same
line of reasoning is true of pilots. The sortie generation
rate is important in keeping pressure on enemy forces and
precluding disengagement. [Ref. 25]
Given the above emphasis on survivability and weapons
effectiveness assumptions, an Air Force study evaluated the
A-10 against the Enforcer. It is described in the next
section.
B. AIB FORCE AIALISIS
In late 197 4 as the pressure to legitimize Enforcer
(Chapter VI) was increasing, the Air Force directed its
Aeronautical Systems Division and elements on the Air Staff
to conduct a formal evaluation. [Ref. 26]. The objectives
were to: 1) compile comparative data for other aircraft, 2)
assess the potential for U.S. Air Force use of the Enforcer
concept, and 3) evaluate a proposed prototype flight test
program. The ASD portion involved about 40 man-months of
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effort by its engineering, financial and test personnel. The
Assistant Chief of Staff for Studies and Analysis at Air
Force Headquarters conducted an operational effectiveness
evaluation in a NATO scenario.
The Air Force technical evaluation at ASD focused on a
Piper-Lockheed modified Enforcer proposal including stiffer
engine mounts and a new horizontal tail. Data and informa-
tion were generated from discussions with Lockheed and with
Mr. Lindsay and from inspection of the existing prototype
and related material. Features evaluated were: 1) structure
and weight, 2) aerodynamic drag, 3) propellor/engine
performance, 4) stability and control, 5) selected subsys-
tems, and 6) vulnerability. Results correlated reasonably
well with the predictions of Lockheed and Mr. Lindsay. A
cost evaluation was conducted for a two- and four-aircraft
prototype program, a follow-on full scale development
program, several production programs, and for the annual
operating and support costs of a typical Enforcer squadron.
The results are summarized in Table I below.
The proposed full scale development program included
development of the military subsystems and comprehensive
ground and flight testing of six additional test aircraft,
leading to a production version of an operationally config-
ured weapons system.
The 733-unit production proposal for the Enforcer
included non-recurring costs, recurring costs of the
aircraft supporting ground equipment, training equipment,
data and spares. Where possible, the evaluators compared the
Enforcer program above with a 733-unit program of A-7D,
A-37, OV-10, and A- 10 aircraft. The results suggested that
if there were a place in the Air Force inventory for an
Enforcer it would be in lieu of, or in a high/low mix with,
the A-10. Most of the A-7D capabilities were for missions




EOfl Program Cost Summary - 1975 $ (In Millions)
Prototypes (if) $ 10.8
Full Scale Development 129.9
Production (733) 955.3
Total Acquisition $1,096.0
Flyaway Unit Cost 1.06
Annual & S Per Squadron 8.5
Source: USAF Briefing
Team
limited c.a.s. capability, the F-4 was primarily an inter-
ceptor and the OV-10 was never used in a c.a.s. mission.
Table II compares the above Enforcer costs with estimated
A-10 costs in the sase categories.
ASD engineers also evaluated performance data foe bcth
aircraft and concluded that the aircraft were similar in the
categories of takeoff roll, landing ground roll, flotation
characteristics (tire characteristics and clearances for
unprepared field operations) , maximum speed, loiter time v.
radius of operation, and vulnerability. This data enabled
the Air Force to design an equal-effectiveness model between




A- 10/ Enforcer Cost Comparisons
A-10 3-31-75 Enforcer 3-31-75





























NOTES: 1975 dollars for out-year development
Development quantities include 4 prototypes
for each aircraft
Overall bottom line: Enforcer costs 45% of A-10 (unit)
Armed with the atove performance and cost data, Air
Staff personnel conducted a cost-effectiveness comparison by
inserting both aircraft into a worst-case scenario - a
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massive tank assault (called a breakthrough) into NATO's
central European theater with its severly hostile air
defense environment- This was the scenario for which many of
the A-10's more sophisticated features (wing loading,
internal 30 mm cannon, armor plating) were optimized. Using
the valid methodology used in a previous A-10/A-7D compar-
ison, equal-effectiveness numbers were computed and ccsted
out. The source of all of the analysis data in this chapter
except Tables III and 17 is the Air Force briefing team
presentation to House and Senate subcommittees in 1975.
Figure 7. 1 below shows an overview of the computer
programs used in the analysis.
Two specific anti-armor configurations were considered,
with the assumed daylight configuration shown below in
figure 7.2. The ALQ-119/13 1 are electronic countermeasures
pods. The ALE-3 7 is a chaff/flare dispenser. For nighttime
operations (under flares), appropriate quantities of rock-
eyes were substituted for the Mavericks, 18 for the A-10 and
4 for the Enforcer. Any adverse effect of the somewhat over-
loaded condition of the Enforcer in this configuration was
ignored, as was any possible performance degradation by the
clustered 106 mm cecoiless rifles on the wingtips. Finally,
to consider the Enforcer in the best possible light in the
inital evaluation, accuracy of the 106 mm rifles was assumed
to be the same as the 30 mm cannon in the A-10.
For classification purposes, graphical results on
figures 7.3 through 7.6 following have been normalized with
the A-10 equal to one and the Enforcer results adjusted
accordingly.
Figure 7.3 shows the relative probability of attrition
and battle damage to Enforcer and A-10 against the defenses
considered in the analysis. It shows the Enforcer subject to
battle damage 1.8 times that of the A-10, with overall
attrition 1.7 times that of the A-10.
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OVERVIEW OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS








































Figure 7.1 COMPUTER MODEL.
Figure 7.4 compares equal forces of 504 A- 10s and 504
Enforcers. The aircraft curves represent percentages of
tanks killed on a tine basis up to day five. By the end of
day five it is estimated that the A-10 has killed 70% more
tanks than the Enforcer, or stated differently, it would
take 888 Enforcers tc match the five day effectiveness of
the A-10, carrying a reduced load of six Maverick missiles.
Although the study did assume equal accuracy for the twc gun
systems, the dotted line does illustrate the average degra-
dation to te expected with vingtip mounted guns. In this
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Figure 7.2 iEAPON LOADS.
Figure 7.5 illustrates the results when the A-10 carries
its standard load of 10 Maverick missiles, vith the Enfcrcer
at its aaximum load (same as figure 7.4) The dotted line
illustrates expected real degradation from wingtip mounted
guns. Here about 984 Enforcers (up to 1,161 with gun degra-
dation) are needed tc match the A-10 five day results.
Figure 7.6 compares bomb loads against combat radii. It
shows that the A-10 can carry almost four times the unrefu-
eled external paylcad on approximately the same radius
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Pigure 7.3 ATTRITION COMPARISON.
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Figure 7.4 B EDUCED LOAD.
Another measure cf capability and potential effective-
ness can be derived by comparing guns. Figure 7.7 depicts
the relative effectiveness of two-second bursts against
various ground targets by the GAU-8 30 mm cannon used in the
A-10, by the M-61 20 mm cannon used in the F-4, F-15 and
F-16, and by the six M-3 50 calibre machine guns in the
proposed production Enforcer. For classification purposes,
the estimated actual GAU-8 30 mm single pass kill prob-
ability has again been normalized to one and the M-61 and
M-3 figures adjusted accordingly. The Chart illustrates that
only the GAU-8 has any capability against a heavy tank, and
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Pigure 7.5 STANDARD LOAD.
also is considerably more effective against the other
targets illustrated.
C. BESOLTS OP TBI AIR FORCE ANALYSIS
The unit flyaway and program unit costs of the Enfcrcer
were estimated at about 45% of the corresponding A-10 costs.
The annual operating and support costs for the Enfcrcer were
estimated at about 8C* of those for the A-10. The A-10,
however, was determined to be from two to four times more
effective than the Enforcer depending on the scenario. These
characteristics were used to evaluate costs of those combi-
nations cf Enforcers and A-10 f s illustrated in Tables III
and IV. This evaluation determined an all-A-10 force to be
the lost cost effective and concluded that there was no
place for the Enforcer in the Air Force inventory.
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Figure 7.6 COMBAT BADII.
Tables TTI and IV expand the above mix options for a
procurement of 733 aircraft in terms of cost versus weighted
effectiveness. The cost basis used for the calculations was
the August 1975 unit flyaway cost of $2.23 million for the
A-10 and $1.06 million for the Enforcer. Table III considers
the upper estimate of effectiveness. This 4: 1 effectiveness
ratio is normalized to the A-10, resulting in an A-10 effec-
tiveness of one and Enforcer equal to 0.25. Intermediate
effectiveness of a mix of A-10's and Enforcers is computed
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From Table III it is clear that the least costly force
of aircraft would be an all -Enforcer mix for a flyaway cost
of $776.98 million if effectiveness were excluded- When the
effectiveness measure is introduced the all A-10 force
becomes the lowest ccst option.
Table 17 examines the low estimate of the effectiveness
range wherein the A-10 is considered twice as effective as
the Enforcer. This ratio is again normalized to the A-10
with A-10 equal to one and Enforcer egual to 0.50. The 2:1
ratio calculations indicate that both the lowest cost
aircraft and the lowest cost "mix" option with effectiveness
considered is the all-Enforcer structure. It also appears
that the minimum effectiveness ratio would be 2:1 since the
difference between the total weighted effectiveness costs of
an all-A-10 force and an all-Enforcer force is $80.63
million. This amount is approximately 5% of the total
flyaway cost and is immaterial. Note that this analysis did
not consider the higher unit costs of a smaller procurement
or a stretched-out buy, nor did it address the effect of
using program unit costs reflecting life cycle considera-
tions. Inclusion of life cycle OSS costs could alter the
results significantly unless the costs were proportional to
flyaway costs. There was no consideration of the costs of
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D. CBITIQOE OF THE flODEL/ANALXSIS
The Air Force did a creditable job constructing a mean-
ingful evaluation/comparison between the Enforcer and the
A-10. A-10 data were derived from early flight testing and
hands-on experience. Enforcer data accepted by the Air Force
were largely engineering estimates of the manufacturer and
designer- The Air Staff evaluators gave an edge to Enforcer
wherever possible. On the other hand, Enforcer was not
developed against a specific operational requirement. The
A-10 was developed precisely for optimum performance against
the threat scenario used in the analysis. The Enforcer was
optimized for day, visual, close air support of ground
troops with a tank capability if needed. It had no deep
interdiction provisions. The A-10 had more sophisticated
instrumentation and avionics, was literally built around the
GAU-8 gun system for optimum performance as a heavy tank
killer. As mentioned in earlier chapters, attrition esti-
mates were significant in determining the outcome of the
analysis- The use of a five day scenario could be questioned
when the three day scenario was widely used by the NATO
planners during the 1S70*s. The operations and support costs
of the Enforcer were pure guesswork and appear high, but it
is difficult to fault the Air Force for a high side estimate
when there was no operational data available, (generation of
this critical data was one of the reasons cited by the manu-
facturer and designer for scheduling operational test
flights) . Whatever the arguments, even in the best case for
Enforcer with its slight total program cost advantage the
approximately $2.0 million extra for the A-10 as an alterna-
tive buys a lot more capability in environments within which
the Enforcer could not operate.
The analysis therefore, has its flaws. The Enforcer 1 s
sensitivity to the harsh scenario chosen is obvious. If the
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scenario were reduced to an infantry skirmish with, perhaps,
mechanized troop carriers or fighting vehicles the Enforcer
emerges as the most cost-effective choice. Enforcer was
born to lose In the fight it was thrust into, but there were
many supporters of the heavy tank breakthrough/five day war
theory in 1974. Arguments can be fashioned to persuade a
listener in either direction, as with most computer anal-
yses, but the edge is always given to the higher technology
option. Following a headquarters review of the analysis
results, the Air Force dropped the issue of formulating a
test plan on the grounds (initially) that it would lead
nowhere. Their justification is summarized from the text of
the analysis: [ fief • 27].
No mix provided a more cost effective force than an
all-A- 10 program, either in terms of future capital
investment, total acquisition, or life cycle cost.
Today the analysis is of historical interest only since
the A- 10 is out of production and its costs are sunk.
Chapter VIII follows the program from the conclusion of the
Air Force analysis to the present, through a turbulent
period during which the Enforcer's congressional and
industry sponsors persisted to the point of providing
supplemental funding for the test program.
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VIII. EMFOBCEB PROGRAM 197521984
A. COIGBESSIOHAL REACTIOH/AIR FORCE RESPONSE
Chapter VI discussed the substantial pressure building
in Congress to find a service sponsor for Enforcer and to
provide for a modest test flight program- The Air Force
consistently referenced the computerized cost effectiveness
analysis results and raised the issue of compliance with
procurement regulations. After the first round of written
requests from various committee members in Congress during
1974 generated an across-the-board "not interested" reply
from DOD, one might have expected the Enforcer issue to have
died. Instead, its support grew stronger and during the
spring of 1975 several hearings were held to air the manu-
facturer's concerns over the Air Force evaluation and to
provide the Air Force with an opportunity for rebuttal.
Between April and July of 1975 subcommittees of both the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees conducted lengthy
sessions with the industry group (primarily Messrs. Lindsay
and Helms) and with the Air Force, represented by Lieutenant
General James Stewart, Commander of the Aeronautical Systems
Division, Air Force Systems Command. [Ref. 28].
The focus of the Air Farce testimony was on the analysis
and both the House and Senate Armed Services Research &
Development Subcommittees had numerous questions concerning
inconsistencies and inaccuracies. There were the usual cour-
tesies at the outset followed by formal summary of the anal-
ysis. It then became evident that the congressmen and
senators had been well prepared for the hearings by their
staffs and perhaps by the industry group whose testimony
preceded the Air Force session. There was, however, nothing
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substantial enough resulting from the cautious give-and-take
and in the various challenges to raise serious questions
about the study results themselves. Since Congress chose not
to kill the Enforcer issue based on the study results it was
probably not the subcommittees* intentions to reverse
anything. It seemed instead that the long discussions about
minor points in the analysis was intended to place the Air
Force in a slightly uncomfortable position prior to more
probing guestions. The following one-sided exchange between
Senator Thurmond and General Stewart indicates that at least
one powerful Enforcer sponsor thought that the air Force was
dodging the real issue: [Eef. 29].
(Senator Thurmond). I have a few questions here to be
propounded. but I would suggest that you gentlemen not
lust toss this thing lightly aside; not just come over
here and oppose it for the sake of opposing it, but be
openminded on it. And that is the way I have been on
this thing, because I have heard both sides of it. But
it seems to me that it is well worth making this test to
find out where we stand on it. If it does not prove out,
OK. If it does prove out, you will certainly want it. I
assume that you do have an open mind on it, do you not?
(General Stewart) I hope so sir. (Senator Thurmond). You
hope so? Well, why do you not? It is your business to
have an open mind on matters that are for the best
interest of the taxpayers. If this plane is successful
and can do the job, it can be bought for $1 million,
where you are going to have to pay $4 million for the
A- 10. why would you not want to use these where you can,
and use the A-10 1 s where you cannot do this? If you have
got your mind shut, there is no use for me to say any
more. If you have made up your mind what you want to do,
and are not willing to keep an open mind here, I do not
care to ask you anything else, or say anything else. But
if you have got an open mind - and I think you ought to
have - then it seems to me that you ought to be willing
to consider saving the taxpayers some money; because I
am fighting all I can foe the Defense Department, and we
are having a hard time, and when we suggest something
here that might save some money that would accomplish
the purpose, we think you ought to consider it. (General
Stewart). les, sir.
The bad chemistry between these two was evident but the
point was made. Senator Thurmond had been receiving brief-
ings on the pros and cons of the Enforcer for four years,
and the bottom line for him was that the analysis seemed
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only a convenient way for the Air Force to brush the system
aside, without recognition of the larger question of its
overall suitability for what it was optimized for- What
seemed only fair play to the Senator would be viewed by the
Air Force as not in accordance with sound acquisition proce-
dure, and, of course, a threat to the A-10 program integ-
rity.
The sessions were at an impasse with respect to the
Enforcer program, but there was a sense in the subcommittee
that it would eventually move forward again. The Air Force
analysis, their primary excuse for not considering a test
program for Enforcer, was dismissed by some of the senators
as incapable of properly addressing the Enforcer's real
capabilities. While the Air Force still narrowly viewed the
aircraft as an outsider threatening their established
program's integrity and production plan, subcommittee
members tended to consider it on a stand-alone basis which
left the Air Force clinging to the A.S.P.B. violation
issue. [Eef. 30]
The Air Force position on the legality of Enforcer's
test proposal was a complex one. They based a refusal to
test the aircraft with their own funds on a combination of
requirements. 0MB Circular A-109 directs the services to
first obtain Secretary of Defense approval for a mission
need statement, and then to explore alternative solutions to
the mission need. The next phase in acquisition, exploratory
development, requires solicitation of competition under the
provisions of DOD Instruction 5000.1 and page 8 of the A-109
Circular. The subsequent demonstration and full scale devel-
opment phases require parallel development of competitive
prototypes wherever feasible under provisions of the same
two directives. The production phase introduces provisions
of 10 O.S.C. 2304 (a) (10) as implemented by A.S.P.E. 3-210
and 10 a.S.C. 2304 (a) (14) implemented by A.S.P. R. 3-214
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allowing sole source contract awards in certain circum-
stances. The Air Force position, therefore, led to an
impasse because it maintained that Enforcer was not spon-
sored by a service in response to a mission need in the
first place, and that it did not meet the criteria for sole
source production award even if non-Air Force money were
provided for the test program, £Ref. 31]
The industry group countered with a lengthy opinion
prepared by Hr. Lindsay's counsel, Mr. Loren K. Olson,
which concluded that Enforcer could legally be procured by
the Air force for flight test and subsequent production. The
key directive permitting this was again the A.S.P. R.
,
specifically sections concerned with contractors' rights in
cases of private development with private funds - in other
words sole source was auth3rized, eliminating the Air Force
insistence on competition. [Ref. 32]
It seemed that all that remained was identification of
the resources. Congress, choosing not to challenge the Air
Force's continued insistence that expenditure of Air Force
funds for any Enforcer-related project would violate the
mission need statement requirement of Circular A-109,
decided to attempt passage of a separate appropriation. It
would have been "fenced" for the exclusive use of the Air
Force to purchase prototype Enforcers and test them. Just
when it seemed Enforcer was off and running with a $5.6
million dollar appropriation nestled in the fiscal 1978
defense appropriation, it was knocked out of the race by
political "sour grapes" The congressional antics were summa-
rized in a Washington newspaper article. [Ref. 33].
The services have firmly resisted a full-scale flight
test for the smaller plane for more than three years,
claiming that there is no requirement for it. -.For a
time, it seemed that the Congress might decide other-
wise. Last month, a Senate defense subcommittee voted
unanimously to include $5.6 million in a Pentagon appro-
friations bill to pay for the building and testing of
our prototype models of the fighter-- .But apparently
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there is no reckoning with the resistance of the service
bureacracy ar of the old-school ties on Capitol Hill. In
what amounted to a jurisdictional dispute over the
authorization, Sens- Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., and
Howard W. Cannon, D-Nev., both Air Force generals,
combined forces to get the sum knocked out of the bill
as a 'waste of money'... As a result the Enforcer, whichjust might have saved the American taxpayer several
Billions, is back en the old drawing board.
It wasn't to remain on the drawing board for long,
however. The funds were appropriated the following year. One
might observe that after six years of service inaction on
the proposal, Congress was entitled to play political foot-
ball with it for one season.
For a number of reasons ranging from delays at Piper to
technical contractual difficulties to old fashioned foot
dragging, the Air Force failed to spend any of the first
appropriation. This generated a strong rebuke from Congress
and a subsequent appropriation twice as large, $11.8
million, for fiscal year 19 81, to complete the program.
B. THE TEST PROGRAM
In January 1983, 12 years after -the PAVE COIN demonstra-
tion, the Piper Enforcer began its modest test flight
program. The first phase at Piper facilities in Lakeland,
Florida involved about 175 flights. Test objectives were to
establish flying characteristics including performance,
flutter and air loads. Some on-board systems were also
tested. In February 1984 it arrived at Eglin Air Force Base
in Florida and began a 56-flight program of weapons separa-
tion tests and establishment of radar and infrared cross-
sections. The final phase involves 74 operational
demonstration sorties at Edwards Air Force Base in
California- Final completion is expected in during the
summer of 1984. [ Ref- 34]
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IX. C0HC1DSIQHS AMD RECOMMENDATIOHS
A. SOMAHY REMARKS
The Enforcer history is one of a struggle on many fronts
over a single issue: what is the most cost effective way to
provide for our defenses in an atmosphere of resource
constraints? Although the focus narrows to a relatively
small program in a very specialized mission area, the much
broader issue involving all defense acquisitions is mirrored
by the Enforcer-
After more than a dozen years since its first exposure
to the military, the Enforcer controversy is nearing an end-
It is unclear what the final decision will be, but whether
or not a decision to procure the Enforcer results, the char-
acteristics of the struggle will remain- The issues which
placed the Enforcer in the limelight are unresolved. These
issues include, but are not limited to: the limits of
congressional authority over weapons research and develop-
ment spending, interpretations of the A.S.P.R. sole source
guidance, objectivity in the process of developing specific
operational requirements, elimination of interservice rival-
ries and parochialism from the weapons acquisition process,
and the proper role of computerized cost effectiveness anal-
yses in system evaluation.
Congress disagreed with the military on each of the
above issues- It attempted to "insert" the Enforcer into the
system with a legitimacy it didn f t have. The missing ingre-
dient was service sponsorship. It will never be known
whether or not Enforcer might have competed successfully
against alternatives, if any, had there been service spon-
sorship, or a specifically tailored O.R., or both (the more
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likely case). What is known is that under the set of circum-
stances presented, the services were able to produce a
variety of roadblocks to its success, ranging from the
simple "foot-dragging" of the early 1970' s to the sophisti-
cated and complex legal objections when delaying tactics
failed.
One of the reasons Congress kept the Enforcer program
alive was their inclination to support the underdog, an
underdog with persuasiveness and tenacity. To his credit,
Mr. Lindsay never waivered from his initial position with
respect to what the Enforcer was trying to be and where he
expected it to go. The Air Force proved inconsistent in
testimony, jumped from one excuse to another for not testing
the aircraft, and, now that it is being tested, has made
some changes to the prototype unrelated to the aircraft's
intended mission. Congress had a clear picture of what the
Enforcer was designed to do, and what they wanted from the
military was an operational flight test program to properly
validate its designer's claims. Enforcer is an aircraft for
the "dirty work" of close air sup.port, the dangerous but
necessary support of infantry fighting forces on the ground.
This essential mission element of close support will remain
a characteristic of conventional warfare between armies for
the foreseeable future, and the United States doesn't have a
system optimized for it. The Air Force was riveted on the
central European tank breakthrough scenario, perhaps with
good reason. There was nothing wrong with this emphasis
except that the military tailored its force accordingly and
in the process lost a few of the more desirable "dirty work"
characteristics in their aircraft. Their front-line A- 10 is
inferior to the Enforcer in simplicity of operations, main-
tainability, fuel consumption at low altitudes, and turn-
around time. It isn't clear whether or not these were





Mr- Lindsay and the manufacturer insisted that Enforcer
was designed to supplement the A-10 type aircraft and that
it should not have been evaluated as an alternative to, or
in combinatioa with, the A-10, Despite their position, the
economic facts of life throughout Enforcer's twelve year
experience in DOD and in Congress precluded the supplement
approach. It is inconceivable that any proposed buy of
Enforcers during the 1970* s would involve additional funds
for hardware in the close air support mission area. Even if
there had been a specific operational requirement for the
Enforcer's "dirty work" scenario, a modest mix with the A-10
force is much more likely given the pressure to hold down
spending. This story is, therefore, really one of a high/low
mix candidate within existing funding constraints. None knew
this tetter than the Air Force close air support program
managers. A vote for Enforcer was a vote to reduce force
levels in their A-10 program, or at least to stretch out the
procurement. Their response was reasonable in the highly
competitive environment of program management. Just as
reasonable, however, was the response in Congress. Their
decision environment was considerably different as they
attempted a balance between a strong defense and taxpayer
appeasement.
It is difficult to observe the priority Congress
afforded Enforcer without observing that some of the credit
for this belongs to Mr. Lindsay. After a meeting with Mr.
Lindsay at his California home the authors are convinced
that his twelve-year personal dedication to promoting the
Enforcer concept all over the country and his testimony year
in and year out to members of Congress kept the program
alive in the face of adversity. Others came and went, but
none were 100% privately funded like the Enforcer and none
had a David Lindsay devoting a consistent, sincere effort.
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Can a low cost alternative weapon system like the
Enforcer find acceptance by the Defense Department in
todays acquisition environment? The authors believe that
service sponsorship is an absolutely essential ingredient to
the acquisition process, although it won't be found in a
milestone chart. Institutional resistance to an outsider,
that "not invented here" syndrome Mr- Lindsay discussed, is
a force powerful enough to hold back the Congress for twelve
years- It won 1 t dissolve overnight, and future Enforcers can
expect the sane long, uphill battle for formal recognition
if they don't have equal influential backing somewhere in
DOD.' The flexibility built into the language of the acquisi-
tion regulations can and will be used by the services to
sabotage congressional sponsorship- Service parochialism and
rivalry remains as strong as ever, indeed to some degree it
is desirable until it interferes with the rational
decision-making process- Computerized cost effectiveness
analyses are certainly not the ultimate test, but they are a
valuable tool for comparison and they are getting more
sophisticated every year. The only real limitation with
analysis is the human input, the judgements and assumptions
necessary to quantify a problem but critical to the results.
Our system of checks and balances prevents spending abuses
within the agencies, but it is a two-edged sword: the
Congress is likewise limited in its ability to "steer"
discretionary appropriations such as research and develop-
ment into specific programs which are not already approved
DOD programs. There has been change in the acquisition area
since 1971, but it has been more evolutionary than revolu-
tionary and a new Enforcer introduced this year might




C. PROJECTED ACQOISITIOH ENVIRONMENT
The defense budget is certain to be in the spotlight in
an election year with record defense outlays and a growing
deficit. The near-term strain on the defense budget submis-
sions will test the ability of DOD to rise above politics
and keep the major programs intact- The climate for intro-
ducing new lower cost alternative systems will never be
better than in the the next five years- As of this writing
an as yet unreleased GAO report paints a dismal picture for
defense acquisitions through 1988: [Ref. 35].
A new congressional study, in a highly critical report
of the Pentagons budget planning. warns that actual
military spending from 1984 through 1988 is likely to
run as much as $324 billion over original estimates and
still be inadequate to buy all the weapons originally
sought. The still-unreleased study by the General
Accounting Office, Congress* watchdog on government
operations, is heightening fears among lawmakers that
tne federal budget deficit could grow even higher than
pessimistic forecasters now predict. . .The findings are
certain to be troubling to those members of Congress who
have been counting on defense cuts to reduce budget
deficits that could climb from nearly $200 billion this
year to above $300 billion by 1989.. .The GAO study found
that the Pentagon underestimates costs in virtually
every area of its budget, including regular operations
and maintenance. But the largest miscalculations - two-
thirds of the total overrun - involve weapon programs...
The projected acquisition environment for the next four
years is not favorable for the big ticket systems. It may
not even be favorable for low cost alternatives but they
will certainly have a batter chance than the high end.
Congress can be expected to respond favorably to
Enforcer-type offerings (privately funded and available in
high quantities at low unit costs). It would be reasonable
to assume that even at Defense some managers may reconsider
lower cost alternatives that were previously cast aside, if
only to take some of the pressure off of the larger systems




In many ways 19 84 is like 1974 for defense acquisition
managers. Large spending cuts are being proposed, unit costs
continue to zlimb, and the "catch-up" defense spending
projections which may not have caught up anyway are now
under revision, downward revision. The only recommendation
foe acquisition managers that saems appropriate in this
environment is to carefully weigh the advantages and disad-
vantages of a high/low mix wherever possible in new system
selection decisions* The highly sophisticated, costly
systems are subject to stretched-out buys and wholesale
cuts. An attractive package of low end alternatives in quan-
tity and high cost complements in small numbers may be the
only way a new force package can be accepted in Congress.
The argument that a lower cost alternative threatens the
integrity of the high end program it complements will
dissolve in the realities of the growing deficit and reduced
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